问题：Using a Dual-Sourcing Option in the Presence of Asymmetric Information about Supplier Reliability: Competition vs. Diversification
主讲人：Dr. Zhibin (Ben) Yang (University of Oregon)
时间：2011年8月16日（周二）上午11:00
所在：伟易博新楼354聚会室
Title: “Using a Dual-Sourcing Option in the Presence of Asymmetric Information about Supplier Reliability: Competition vs. Diversification”
We study a buyer’s strategic use of a dual-sourcing option when facing suppliers possessing private information about their disruption likelihood. We solve for the buyer’s optimal procurement contract. We show that the optimal contract can be interpreted as the buyer choosing between diversification and competition benefits. Better information increases
diversification benefits and decreases competition benefits. Therefore,with better information the buyer is more inclined to diversify. Interestingly, better information may increase or decrease the value of thedual-sourcing option, depending on the size of the buyer's revenue (with large per unit revenue the attractiveness of diversification makes information and a dual-sourcing option complements). Surprisingly, under asymmetric information, the buyer may cease to diversify in reaction to eroding supply base reliability in order to leverage competition, while it would do just the opposite under symmetric information. Finally, we analyze the effect of codependence between supply disruptions. We find that lower codependence leads the buyer to rely less on competition. Because competition keeps the information costs in check, a reduction in supplier
codependence increases the buyer's value of information. Therefore, strategic actions to reduce codependence between supplier disruptions should not be seen as a substitute for learning about suppliers’ reliabilities.
Dr. Zhibin (Ben) Yang joined the Lundquist College of Business in fall 2009. He holds Ph.D. in Industrial and Operations Engineering from the University of Michigan, a master's degree in Industrial Engineering from Arizona State University, and a bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering from Southwest Jiaotong University in China. He is interested in decentralized supply chain management with an emphasis on supply chain risk management. His recent research effort is focused on supply-disruption risk management where the buyer lacks information about its suppliers’ reliabilities. Dr. Yang uses game-theoretic models to analyze managerial decisions of the supply chain firms. He has published in Management Science, and is a member of the Institute for Operations Research and Management Science (INFORMS), the Manufacturing and Service Operations Management Society (M&SOM) and Production and Operations Management Society (POMS).
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